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EMPLOYMENT LAW-EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY

ACT-PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW-The United State Supreme

Court held that state hospital rate-setting statutes which impose
a significant indirect burden on Employee Retirement Income
Security Act plans do not "relate to" the plans sufficiently to
invoke preemption of state laws.

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
Hospital rates in the State of New York are governed by
principles 1 that consider the identity of a health insurance
payor as a factor in determining the amount a hospital may bill
for a patient's inpatient hospital stay.2 For example, if a patient
is enrolled in a Blue Cross/Blue Shield ("Blue Cross") plan,
Medicaid, or certain Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMO's"), that patient's hospital stay is billed at a rate based
on the patient's diagnosis.' Patient diagnoses are categorized
into one of 794 Diagnostic Related Groups ("DRG's"). 4 The DRGbased reimbursement system figures the average cost to treat
each of the 794 diagnoses.5 Thus, all patients with a specific
diagnosis, regardless of the actual cost of treatment incurred,

1.

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Trav-

elers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1673 (1995). See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c
(McKinney 1993). Section 2807-c of the Public Health Law sets forth general hospital
inpatient reimbursement methodologies for the State of New York effective from
January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1995. id.
2. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. "Unique among the states, however, New York provides that the amount
charged to a patient is then increased by a 'payor factor,' depending solely upon the
type of health care coverage protecting the patient." Brief for Respondents, The
Travelers Insurance Company, et al., at 3, New York State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (Nos. 93-1408, 94-1414, 93-1415).
3. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. Diagnosis is defined as "the discovery of the source of a patient's illness or
the determination of the nature of his disease from a study of its symptoms."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 453-54 (6th ed. 1990).
4. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. The DRG system adopted by New York is based on the DRG system established under Medicare. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(3)(a) (McKinney 1993).
5. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674.
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are generally billed at the same rate under the DRG-based
system.6
The impetus behind New York State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans was the fact that some health insurance
payors were being charged the applicable DRG rate, plus one or
more of several surcharges imposed under New York law,7 of
which three were at issue.8 The first surcharge allowed a
hospital to bill for a patient's hospital stay at the applicable
DRG rate plus a thirteen percent surcharge.' Even though state
law imposed the first surcharge, the hospital could keep any
proceeds the surcharge generated. ° Payors upon whom this
surcharge was imposed included commercial insurance carriers
other than Blue Cross," self-insurance funds, and motor
vehicle insurance funds. 2
6. Id. The concept of DRG's is explained as follows:
[AIll patient illnesses and injuries resulting in admission to a hospital are
classified into different groups, termed diagnosis-relatedgroups (DRG's), that
are clinically coherent and relatively homogeneous with respect to resources
Using this classification system, Medicare has develused by a hospital ....
oped a system of payments to hospitals under which each DRG (i.e., each type
of injury or illness) will be paid at a set rate. If a hospital's costs are less
than that rate, the hospital keeps the difference; if the hospital's costs are
more than the set rate, the hospital incurs the loss.
COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., 1992 MEDICARE EXPLAINED 154 (1992).

7. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. Travelers Insurance Company contended that the surcharges placed an
enormous burden on employee benefit plans and participants, costing them "hundreds of millions of dollars annually." Brief for Respondents, The Travelers Insurance
Company, et al., at 5-6, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (Nos. 93-1408, 93-1414, 93-1415).
8. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. The three surcharges at issue were applied at the rates of 13%, 11% and
9%. Id.
9. Id. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1993).
10. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1993). The law directs
hospitals to use funds obtained as a result of the surcharge "for patient care purposes." Id.
11. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1673. See Brief for Petitioner, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans, at 3, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans,
115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (Nos. 93-1408, 93-1414, 93-1415). The principal reason that
Blue Cross was not subjected to the surcharges was because the preferential treatment assisted Blue Cross "in shouldering the burden of open enrollment for individuals and small groups (that is insuring all applicants without regard to age, occupation or physical condition) on a community rated basis as well as other publicly
responsible activities." Id.
12. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1993). Commercial
insurance is defined as "[ilndemnity agreements . . . whereby parties to commercial
contracts are to a designated extent guaranteed against loss by reason of a breach
of contractual obligations on the part of the other contracting party." BLACK'S LAW
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The second surcharge at issue allowed a hospital to bill for a
patient's hospital stay at the applicable DRG rate plus an eleven
percent surcharge. 3 The second surcharge was collected by the
hospital, and the hospital then remitted the surcharge to the
State of New York. 4 The second surcharge was imposed upon
commercial insurance carriers (other than Blue Cross)15 and
only applied to discharges occurring between April 1, 1992 and
March 31, 1993.16 For this one-year period, some commercial
insurance carriers were actually subjected to both the thirteen
percent surcharge and the eleven percent surcharge--thus
incurring hospital claims twenty-four percent higher than those
payors not subjected to the surcharges."
The third surcharge was imposed on certain HMO's."5
Depending upon the number of Medicaid patients an HMO
DICTIONARY 803 (6th ed. 1990).

Self-insurance is defined as "[t]he practice of setting aside a fund to meet
losses instead of insuring against such through insurance." Id. at 1360.
13. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1l)(i) (McKinney 1993).
14. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub
nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995). The funds collected pursuant to the surcharge were
ultimately deposited into New York's general fund. Id.
15. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1673. See supra note 11.
16. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(11)(i) (McKinney 1993). After that
time period new "insurance reform legislation" became effective in New York, and
the need for the surcharge apparently ceased. Brief for Petitioner, New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, at 9, New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (Nos. 93-1408, 93-1414, 931415).
17. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(11)(i) (McKinney 1993). The statute
acknowledges that the 13% surcharge may also apply, and it refers to the 11% surcharge as a "supplementary payment rate conversion factor" that yields a "total
conversion factor of 24%." Id.
18. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(2-a)(a)-(2-a)(e) (McKinney 1993 &
Supp. 1995). An HMO will not be subject to this surcharge if it reaches its "Medicaid target" as calculated by the state. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(2-a)(c)(i)
(McKinney Supp. 1995).
An HMO is defined as a "health care system, operating within a specific
geographical area, in which an organization hires medical professionals to provide a
wide range of specified medical services for their prepaid subscribers." WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 621 (3d college ed. 1988).

The "Medicaid target" is generally calculated under the New York statute by
multiplying the number of subscribers in an HMO by the number of Medicaid-eligible persons in an HMO's geographical area divided by the total population in the
HMO's area (subject to an adjustment factor). N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(2a)(a)(iv)(A), (v)(A) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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enrolled, the surcharge could have been imposed at its
maximum level, nine percent, or it could have been reduced
pursuant to the statute."9 The state received the surcharge
directly from the HMO's.'0
The state, through the imposition of the three surcharges,
effectively raised, the cost of health care insurance provided
through commercial insurers other than Blue Cross." Suit was
initiated by commercial insurers" in their role as fiduciaries for
those plans affected by the surcharges in an attempt to
invalidate the surcharges."
The Southern District Court of New York, on cross-motions for
summary judgment and motion to stay pending appeal,
invalidated the surcharges because the surcharges were
preempted" under Section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")." The district court,

19. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(2-aXc)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1995). If an
HMO reaches 25% of its Medicaid target, the 9% surcharge is reduced by 25%; if it
reaches 50% of its Medicaid target, the surcharge is reduced by 50%; if it reaches
75% of its Medicaid target, the surcharge is reduced by 75%. Id.
20. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1674. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(2-a)(e)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1995). The
funds are ultimately deposited in the state's general fund. Id.
21. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1678-79. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd
sub norn. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995). The effect of the surcharges gave Blue Cross a
competitive advantage over other commercial insurers. Travelers Ins., 14 F.3d at 712
22. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1675. See Travelers Ins., 14 F.3d at 708. Listed as Plaintiffs-Appellees in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals case were: The Travelers Insurance Company,
Health Insurance Association of America, American Council of Life Insurance, Life
Insurance Council of New York, Inc., Aetna Life Insurance Co., Aetna Health Plans
of New York, Inc., Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, The Union Labor Life Insurance Company, Professional Insurance Agents of New York, Inc. Trust. Id. Listed
as Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees in the court of appeals case were: New York State
Health Maintenance Organization Conference and Health Services Medical Corporation, MVP Health Plan, Wellcare of New York, Mid-Hudson Health Plan, Oxford
Health Plan, Capital District Physicians Health Plan, Choicecare Long Island, Independent Health, Travelers of New York, Physicians Health Services, Preferred Care
and U.S. Healthcare. Id.
23. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1675.
24. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nor. New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671
(1995). The doctrine of preemption holds "that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to local, character that federal laws preempt or take precedence over
state laws." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Travelers Ins., 813 F. Supp. at 1012. The district court also found that
neither the Tax Injunction Act nor the doctrine of laches barred plaintiffs' claim; two
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through a broad reading of the preemption clause, noted that
the requisite relationship between New York State law and the
ERISA plans existed based on several factors.26 The surcharges
would, at least indirectly, increase costs for the ERISA plans. 7
Also, the plans could pass along the increase to their customers,
who may ultimately switch insurance companies and select Blue
Cross coverage because Blue Cross is not subject to the
surcharges and need not reflect them in its cost of coverage.28
ERISA's savings clause did not save the surcharges from
preemption because the surcharges merely altered the
competitiveness of the insurance carriers, which in the court's
opinion did not rise to the level of insurance regulation."5
The State of New York and the New York Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans appealed the decision of the district
court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which substantially affirmed the decision below."
Supporting a broad interpretation of the ERISA preemption
clause, the Second Circuit concluded that the surcharges related
to employee benefit plans as contemplated under ERISA, even
though the impact of the surcharges on employee benefit plans
might be deemed indirect.' The Second Circuit opined that the
requisite connection of the surcharges to ERISA plans stemmed
from the "significant economic burden" that the surcharges

of the surcharges were preempted by the Federal Employee Health Benefit Act; and
parts of an Actuarial Information Letter issued by the Department of Insurance
were preempted under ERISA. Id. at 999. Defendants' motion to stay pending appeal
was granted in part and denied in part. Id. at 1013. Plaintiffs subject to the 13%
surcharge were ordered to continue to pay the surcharge, but any amounts owing
pursuant to the other surcharges did not have to be remitted but were to be deposited into an escrow account pending issue resolution. Id.
Section 514(a) of ERISA states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
26. Travelers Ins., 813 F. Supp. at 1003-05.
27. Id. at 1003.
28. Id. The district court further supported its conclusion that preemption
applies by noting that a plan could lower the level of insurance benefits provided, as
an alternative to raising costs, thus affecting the operation of the plan itself. Id. at
1004. The court also pointed out that should a plan lower benefit levels, plan administration would no longer be consistent from state to state. Id. at 1004-05.
29. Id. at 1008. The savings clause under ERISA provides that "[e]xcept as
provided . . . nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
30. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub
nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
31. Travelers Ins., 14 F.3d at 719.
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placed on the plans.3 2 Recognizing that a recent United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case, United Wire, Metal
& Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hospital33 addressed the same issue, the Second Circuit
acknowledged the conflict between its decision and the narrower
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause set forth by the
Third Circuit. 4 The surcharges were ultimately held to be
preempted, according to the court, upon its determination that
the surcharges did not fall within the narrow exception to
ERISA preemption offered by the savings clause because the
surcharges were not intended to regulate the business of
insurance. 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari36 to
resolve the split of authority between the Second and Third
Circuits over the proper scope of the ERISA preemption clause
with respect to rate-setting statutes where the impact on
employee benefit plans is only indirect. 7 Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court3" which considered whether
the New York surcharges that increased hospital inpatient rates
charged to certain insurance payors related to employee benefit
plans to the extent that they were invalidated by ERISA's

32. Id. at 721.
33. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
34. Travelers Ins., 14 F.3d at 721. The Third Circuit held that New Jersey's
hospital rate-setting statutes were not preempted by ERISA. United Wire, Metal &
Machine Health & Welfare Fund, 995 F.2d at 1196. The court commented that Congress did not intend "to frustrate the efforts of a state, under its police power, to
regulate health care costs." Id. According to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit's
narrow view of preemption was based on a case that rejected preemption unless the
state law involved regulated "the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans."
Travelers Ins., 14 F.3d at 719, 721. The narrowness of that interpretation was later
rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id.
The Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), to support its conclusion. Travelers Ins., 14
F.3d at 719. In Ingersoll-Rand, the Supreme Court noted that Congress did not
intend "to restrict ERISA's pre-emptive effect to state laws purporting to regulate
plan terms and conditions." Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 141. See infra notes 136-44
and the accompanying text for a discussion of Ingersoll-Rand.
35. Travelers Ins., 14 F.3d at 723.
36. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 305 (1994) (granting certiorari). Certiorari is defined as a
"writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an inferior court requiring the
latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court "uses the writ of certiorari as a
discretionary device to choose the cases it wishes to hear." Id.
37. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1676.
38. Id. at 1673.
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preemption clause. 9
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district
court and the court of appeals.4 The Court's analysis
considered the language of ERISA in an attempt to define
whether a state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan.4'
Acknowledging that a reading of the statute alone could lead to
unrestrained interpretations due to the potential vastness of the
statutory language, the Court shifted its focus to the
congressional intent behind ERISA legislation-the development
of uniform and consistent employee benefits law.42
To establish a baseline for analytical comparison, the Court
stated that preemption under ERISA should clearly apply if a
state law has a direct effect on the administration of an
employee benefit plan or on the benefits offered by such a
plan.43 Exploring the motivation behind the New York
surcharges, the Court determined that the surcharges were
imposed on commercial insurers other than Blue Cross,
primarily because Blue Cross incurred additional costs by
enrolling many persons considered uninsurable by other
commercial plans." The resultant economic effect on ERISA

39. Id. at 1676.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1677. An "employee benefit plan" is defined as "an employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3)
(1988). An "employee welfare benefit plan" is defined as:
[Any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund,
or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section
186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance
to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
An "employee pension benefit plan" is defined as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that . . . such plan,
fund, or program(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2XA) (1988).
42. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1677.
43. Id. at 1678.
44. Id.
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plans was considered to be merely indirect.4 While the New
York surcharges admittedly affected an employee benefit plan's
cost of providing health insurance, the Court opined that such
surcharges did not mandate the choice of one particular health
insurer.4 ' The Court reasoned that the surcharges were not
inconsistent with the congressional intent behind the enactment
of ERISA because, notwithstanding any effect on the cost of
providing coverage, the surcharges did not adversely affect
uniformity of plan administration or benefit provision. 7
The Court then described several common situations in which
state regulations that indirectly affected employee benefit plans
were permitted to stand despite an effect on the overall cost of
the plan." For example, the Court noted that a state may
impose quality control standards on health care services
provided pursuant to an ERISA plan without invalidation under
ERISA, even though the imposition of such standards would
raise the costs of the plan.49
The Court also looked to the rules of statutory construction in
an effort to lend further support to its analysis of ERISA's
preemptive scope.5" Because the ERISA statute requires a state
law to "relate to" a benefit plan before it will be preempted by
ERISA, the Court reasoned that there is clearly some restriction
intended to apply to the reach of preemption.5' According to the
Court, too broad an interpretation of ERISA's preemption
provision would effectively negate the restriction and would run
counter to proper statutory interpretation that implies that once
any such restriction is set forth, it is intended to have some
substantive meaning.2
Thus, the Court concluded that if it invalidated the New York
surcharges solely on the basis that the surcharges had an
indirect effect on ERISA plans, then it would effectively have

45. Id. at 1679.
46. Id.
47. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1679.
48. Id. The Court specifically referred to state regulation of quality control
standards and employment conditions. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Statutory construction is defined as a "judicial function required when
a statute is invoked and different interpretations are in contention." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1412 (6th ed. 1990).
51. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1679. The Court reasoned that too broad an interpretation of ERISA's preemption
provision would "effectively read the limiting language in § 514(a) out of the statute." Id.
52. Id.
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invalidated a multitude of existing state regulations that also
have such indirect effects. 3 The Court recognized that ERISA
was not meant to interfere with general health, safety, and
welfare regulations traditionally legislated at the local level.54
Also, since the New York Legislature's objective in applying the
surcharges was cost-uniformity," and in light of the fact that
the surcharges only had an indirect effect on ERISA plans,"
the Court was unable to justify ERISA preemption.57 According
to the Court, the situation dealt with in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans did not rise to a
level consistent with the congressional intent behind the passage
of ERISA. 5 Thus, the Court pointed out that the effect of the
surcharges was that ERISA plans would have another factor to
consider when picking and choosing a health insurance
carrier. 9 The Court ultimately determined that this indirect
interference with employee benefit plans, however, did not
"relate to" the plans in a manner that necessitated
preemption.60
In further support of its conclusion, the Court explored the
scope of Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,6"
which upheld a state law imposing additional costs on an ERISA
plan by allowing garnishment6 2 of plan assets. 3 The Court

53. Id. The Court commented that the larger the body of legislation that
would have to be invalidated under the reading accorded the statutory language, the
more likely it is that the reading is too broad. Id.
54. Id. at 1680. See HilIsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (holding that "the regulation of health and safety matters is
primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern.").
55. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1678. The court of appeals commented that the purpose of the 13% surcharge
was to "level [the] playing field" between Blue Cross and its competitors. Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub non. New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671
(1995). The Second Circuit further stated that the purpose of the 11% surcharge
was to give Blue Cross a competitive advantage, and that the purpose of the 9%
surcharge was to encourage Medicaid enrollment in HMO plans. Id.
56. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1679.
57. Id. at 1680.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
62. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1680. Garnishment is defined as "[slatisfaction of an indebtedness out of property
or credits of debtor in possession of, or owing by, a third person." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 680 (6th ed. 1990).
63. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1680 (citing Mackey). In Mackey, the Court considered whether a Georgia gar-
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reasoned that if a state could impose such costs on an ERISA
plan, albeit indirect costs, then it should certainly be permitted
to subject an ERISA plan to economic influence, such influence
being less of a burden on an ERISA plan than imposition of
actual costs."
The Court failed to accept the commercial insurers' argument
that the New York surcharges should be preempted unless
application of the savings clause was found.65 The Court
reasoned that New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans did not require a savings clause analysis because
the requisite burden on the ERISA plan was not sufficient to
trigger preemption.66 According to the Court, if the result of the
surcharges would have limited the selection of commercial
insurers to Blue Cross only, then such an argument may have
been more plausible. 7
Finally, the Court emphasized that finding preemption
applicable to such an indirect effect on ERISA plans would
necessitate further invalidation of similar state laws that
indirectly affected such plans.68 To support this point, the Court
set forth numerous examples of state hospital rate regulation
that were already in place when ERISA was enacted. 9 The
Court noted that the legislative history of ERISA did not

nishment statute was invalidated insofar as garnishment proceedings were brought
against an ERISA plan participant. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831. Acknowledging that
creditors had to have some way to enforce their judgments, the Court ultimately
rejected the contention of the plan's trustees that the state law "relates to" the
ERISA plan sufficiently to trigger preemption even though the plan incurred substantial administrative costs as a result of the garnishment proceedings. Id. at 83134. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mackey.
64. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1680.
65. Id. The commercial insurers relied on Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). In Metropolitan Life, the Court briefly addressed the
issue of whether a Massachusetts law that mandated the provision of mental health
benefits by certain employee benefit plans was preempted by ERISA. Metropolitan
Life, 471 U.S. at 739. In Metropolitan Life, the state did not dispute the fact that
the law "related to" the plans, but instead argued that preemption under ERISA
'was precluded by the savings clause. Id. at 738-39. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of Metropolitan Life.
66. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1681.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Court cited laws from numerous states that regulated hospital
charges "to one degree or another" when ERISA was enacted. Id. (citing CAL. INS.
CODE ANN. § 11505 (West 1972), COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 10-16-130, 10-17-108(2)-108(3),
10-17-119(1)(b) (1973), CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-166, 33-172, 33-179k (1975) and NEW
YORK PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807 (McKinney 1971)).
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mention invalidation of such existing state legislation." Also,
with respect to federal legislation, the Court stated that the
same Congress that passed ERISA also passed the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (the
"NHPRDA"). 7' The Court stated that the NHPRDA effectively
encourages state involvement in rate regulation of the health
care industry by providing funding incentives to those states
that comply. 7 According to the Court, Congress would not pass

ERISA, and then subsequently pass the NHPRDA if the two
statutes could not be reconciled.73 The Court concluded that
Congress would not pass ERISA intending that state rate
regulation of employee benefit plans would be preempted, and
then subsequently pass the NHPRDA, which encouraged such
state rate regulation.74
Thus, the Court held that the New York surcharges were
valid and not subject to ERISA preemption.7" Emphasizing that
there may be state laws that indirectly affect ERISA plans that
could be subject to preemption,7 6 the Court clarified that its
holding does not imply that only a state law that directly affects
an ERISA plan can be invalidated. 7 The Court determined that
the indirect effects on ERISA plans caused by the surcharges did
not rise to the level contemplated by ERISA to invoke
preemption.7 ' Therefore, the decision of the Second Circuit was
reversed and the case remanded.79
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect employees and
beneficiaries from unscrupulous practices regarding employer-

70.

Id.

71. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S.Ct.
at 1681-82. The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, Pub. L.
93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
72. Id. at 1682.

73. Id.
74. Id. The Court also discussed the history of the Medicare system and congressional acquiescence to alternative state hospital rate regulation to further demonstrate that some degree of state flexibility is permissible under ERISA. Id. at
1682 n.6.
75. Id. at 1683.
76. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S.Ct.
at 1683. The Court was careful to make the point that indirect effects on ERISA
plans can still trigger preemption, and the holding in this case does not overrule
prior case law that established that proposition. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court noted that such an indirect effect on insurance policy prices
is a common effect of many other state regulations and they are not violative of
ERISA legislation. Id.
79. Id. The case was remanded because neither the district court nor the court
of appeals addressed the surcharges as they applied to self-insured funds. Id. at
1675 n.4.
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established benefit plans."0 A fundamental concept of the
statute allows federal law to supersede or preempt state law in
the event that a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan."' The
purpose behind preemption is to maintain uniformity in
employee benefits law.82 There are three primary sections of
ERISA that deal with preemption-the preemption clause, the
savings clause, and the deemer clause. 3 The preemption clause
is broadly construed, and it mandates the preemption of any
state law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan." Because
the exact breadth of the preemption clause is somewhat unclear,
it is the subject of much litigation." The savings clause limits
Section 514(a) of ERISA in that it allows states to retain the
power to regulate insurance." The savings clause is qualified
by ERISA's deemer clause87 in that the deemer clause specifies
what types of entities are "deemed" appropriate subjects of state
insurance regulation.8
The Supreme Court first considered the scope of ERISA's
preemption clause in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 9 In
Alessi, the Court addressed the issue of whether the ERISA
preemption clause invalidated a New Jersey law that prohibited
an ERISA plan from using a recipient's workers' compensation
benefits to offset pension benefits payable by the plan." The

80. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1983).
81. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987).
83. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990).
84. See supra note 25 for the text of § 514(a) of ERISA which sets forth the
preemption clause.
85. See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct.
580, 586 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens commented that over 2,800
ERISA preemption cases were revealed by a search recently performed on LEXIS.
Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 586 n.3.
86. E.g., FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 57-58. See supra note 29 for the text of 28
U.S.C. § 514(b)(2)(A) which contains the ERISA savings clause.
87. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 57. The text of the deemer clause provides that:
Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
88. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 57-58.
89. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
90. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 507. The statute in question is from the New Jersey
Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 507-08. The relevant section states that [tlhe
right of compensation granted by this chapter may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees' retirement
pension benefits or payments." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980-1981)
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Court began by reviewing principles of federalism to
acknowledge the proper respect due to state laws facing
preemption under federal standards.9 ' Then, looking to
congressional intent behind ERISA legislation, the Court
emphasized that Congress' intent was to have federal law
control employee benefit plan regulation.92 Based on the
express language of the ERISA statute, the Court held that the
state law did "relate to" pension plans because the law
encroached on the actual calculation of pension benefits and
disallowed a federally approved benefit calculation method.93
The Court was careful to limit the scope of its holding by
emphasizing that such an impact on a benefit calculation
method as seen in this case so clearly affects the ERISA plan,
that the Court believed it did not have to define the outer scope
of ERISA's preemption clause in threshold situations. 4
Acknowledging, however, that the state law in Alessi was not
specifically targeted toward pension plans, but rather was a
workers' compensation law with an indirect effect on pension
plans, the Court maintained that preemption may still apply
even when a state law impact on an ERISA plan is indirect.95
The Supreme Court opened the door to a broader scope of
ERISA's preemption clause in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.' In
Shaw, the Court addressed the issue of whether New York
legislation that prohibited discrimination by an employee benefit
plan based on pregnancy, and that mandated certain pregnancy
benefits, had the requisite relationship with ERISA plans to
trigger preemption. 7 The plain language of ERISA guided the
Court's understanding that a state law "relates to" an ERISA

(as amended by 1977 N.J. Laws, ch. 156).
91. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 522. The Court stated that preemption of state law by
federal law is not to be presumed unless the nature of the subject matter necessitates federal preemption or it is the clear intent of Congress. Id.
92. Id. at 522-23.
93. Id. at 524-25. The benefit calculation method that allows the plan to offset
any pension benefits payable with such funds as workers' compensation is known as
integration. Id. Whether integration with workers' compensation benefits is a per-

missible benefit calculation method under ERISA is not specifically addressed in
ERISA legislation. Id. at 517. However, ERISA permits a plan to integrate pension

funds with certain Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits. Id. at 516.
94. Id. at 525.
95. Id.
96. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
97. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88. The New York Human Rights Law prohibited discrimination based on gender. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp.
1982-1983). The New York Disability Benefits Law mandated, inter alia, sick leave
benefits for pregnant women who were unable to work. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw §§
200-42 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1982-1983).
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plan if it "has a connection with or reference to such a plan.""8
Acknowledging that this was a broad interpretation of the
statutory language, the Court found that ERISA's legislative
history supported such an interpretation." The Court held that
the New York legislation clearly related to the ERISA plan
involved because it affected how the plan was structured and
what benefits the plan paid.'0 0 The Court noted that the
structure of the plan was affected because the plan had to
assure that it did not discriminate on the basis of pregnancy.''
The Court also noted that the benefits provided under the plan
were affected because the plan was required to offer sick leave
benefits during pregnancy." 2 The Court acknowledged that its
broad interpretation of the phrase "relates to" has limits and
that a state law may affect an ERISA plan in a fashion too
remote to trigger preemption.1 3 Reluctant to explore those
limits, though, the Court was satisfied that the laws at issue
were clearly within the scope of preemption, and it did not
express an opinion as to how broad the phrase "relates to" could
ultimately be interpreted." 4
In Metropolitan Life Insurance. Co. v. Massachusetts,"5 the
Court was able to work within the boundaries of its previous
decisions to decide whether a state law "related to" an ERISA
plan sufficiently for preemption to be possible.0 6 Specifically,
the issue presented was whether a Massachusetts law that
mandated the provision of mental health benefits by certain
employee benefit plans was preempted by ERISA.' °7 In holding

98. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
99. Id. at 98-99. For example, the Court quoted Senator Williams:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the
substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.
This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State
or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or
effect of law.
Id. at 99 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 29197 (1974)).
100. Id. at 97. After finding that both laws "relate to" an employee benefit
plan, the Court considered whether any other ERISA provisions save the laws from
preemption. Id. at 100.
101. Id. at 97.
102. Id.
103. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
104. Id.
105. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
106. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739.
107. Id. at 738. The Court briefly addressed the issue of whether the Massachusetts law related to ERISA plans in a fashion that would trigger preemption
because the Commonwealth of Massachusetts did not dispute that the requisite rela-
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that the Massachusetts law clearly "related to" ERISA plans so
as to trigger preemption, the Court reiterated the broad scope of
ERISA's preemption clause and clarified that even when a state
law is consistent with ERISA directives, preemption of the state
law can occur.' s The Court characterized the impact on the
ERISA plan as indirect but noted that such impact may
nonetheless invoke preemption."°9
The first case in which the Supreme Court limited the
increasingly broad reach of ERISA's preemption clause was Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne."' In Fort Halifax, the Court
addressed the issue of whether a Maine statute that required
employers to make a severance payment to employees upon
relocation or termination of the employer's business was
preempted by ERISA."' When the Fort Halifax Packing
Company ("Fort Halifax") closed its plant in 1981, employees2
sued for severance pay as set forth in the Maine statute."
Fort Halifax argued that because the state statute affected an
"employee benefit," it was preempted by ERISA.1" The Court
held that preemption did not apply because the Maine statute
affected an "employee benefit" and not an "employee benefit
plan."1 The Court reasoned that the express language of
ERISA does not refer to state regulation of employee benefits,
but to state regulation of "employee benefit plan[s].""' The
Court also held that the underlying purpose of ERISA

tionship existed. Id. at 739. The Court went on to decide a more pertinent issue in
the case; whether preemption under ERISA was precluded by the savings clause. Id.
at 739-47.
108. Id. at 739.
109. Id. The Court believed the impact on the plans was substantial because it
mandated a minimum level of mental health coverage. Id. However, the law's main
focus was to ensure the provision of mental health benefits to state residents. Id. at
758. Thus, because the law was not considered to be directly targeted to employee
benefit plans, the Court classified the impact on the plans as only indirect. Id. at
739.
110. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
111. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 3-4. With respect to the severance payment, the
statute provides that:
Any employer who relocates or terminates a covered establishment shall be
liable to his employees for severance pay at the rate of one week's pay for
each year of employment by the employee in that establishment. The severance pay to eligible employees shall be in addition to any final wage payment
to the employee and shall be paid within one regular pay period after the
employee's last full day of work, notwithstanding any other provisions of law.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B(2) (West Supp. 1986-1987).
112. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 4-5.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 7-8. See supra note 25 for the text of § 514(a) of the ERISA statute.
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preemption, the creation of national uniformity in employee

benefits law to facilitate plan administration, was not violated
by the Maine statute because it did not require an employer to
establish or maintain a benefit plan, and any administrative
burden placed on an employer forced to pay the one-time
payment was de minimis."' Finally, the Court opined that the
underlying purpose of ERISA itself, the protection of employees
and beneficiaries from unscrupulous administrative practices of
an employee benefit plan that jeopardize their right to receive
benefits, was not contravened by the Maine statute because the
administrative activity required to comply with the statute did
not rise to the level of an activated plan."7
One year later, the Court again limited ERISA's preemption
clause in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc."'
The issue before the Court in Mackey was whether a Georgia
garnishment statute was invalidated insofar as garnishment
proceedings were brought against an ERISA plan
participant."' The Court held that the garnishment statute
was not preempted by ERISA because ERISA plans can lawfully
be sued and creditors must have some way to enforce their
judgments."' 0 Trustees of an ERISA plan facing garnishment
proceedings maintained that garnishment of the assets of an

116. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 8-12. The Court pointed out that an employer
may never be burdened by the Maine statute because it only applies when a plant
closes or relocates. Id. at 12. In the event that an employer is subject to the statute, the Court noted that "[t]o do little more than write a check hardly constitutes
the operation of a benefit plan." Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White maintained that an employee benefit
plan was created under the Maine statute, regardless of whether an "administrative
scheme" was required for an employer to comply with the law. Id. at 24 (White, J.,
dissenting).
117. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 15-16.
118. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
119. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831. Mackey involved two Georgia statutes. Id. at
829-31. The first statute exempted ERISA plans from garnishment proceedings if the
proceedings did not relate to collection of alimony or child support. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982). The Court held that this statute was preempted by ERISA
because it expressly referred to ERISA plans in its language. Mackey, 486 U.S. at
830. The second statute was the general garnishment statute in the State of Georgia. See GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-20 (Supp. 1987).
The Court rejected the trustees' argument that for preemption purposes garnishment of plan funds by creditors of a plan is not necessarily treated the same as
garnishment of plan funds by creditors of a plan participant. Mackey, 486 U.S. at
835-36.
120. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 834. Section 502 of the ERISA statute permits an
ERISA plan to "sue or be sued." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (1988). Also, ERISA plans
can be sued for such state claims as "unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even
torts committed by an ERISA plan." Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
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ERISA plan was precluded under ERISA."' However, the
Court rejected the trustees' contention that the state law
"relates to" the ERISA plan sufficiently to trigger preemption
even though the plan incurred substantial administrative costs
as a result of the garnishment proceedings.'2 2
The Supreme Court further limited ERISA's preemptive scope
in Massachusetts v. Morash."' In Morash, the Court was called
on to decide whether ERISA preempted a Massachusetts
criminal statute" 4 that prohibited employers from withholding
accrued vacation pay upon an employee's discharge."' The
Court rejected the employer's argument that ERISA preempted
the statute because vacation pay procedures constituted an
"employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA."5 The Court
reasoned that, similar to the regulation of the payment of wages,
regulation of vacation pay would not further ERISA's legislative
purposes." 7 Clarifying the scope of its holding, the Court noted
that if the vacation benefits would have been accrued or only
conditionally payable, then the vacation benefits may have
constituted an "employee welfare benefit plan" because the
administrative function necessary to provide the benefits would
have been more prevalent." 8 The Court noted that, while the
payment of the vacation benefits from the employer's general
assets did not require ERISA intervention, the existence of a
separate asset fund for vacation pay purposes could pose the
requisite risk to employees that would afford ERISA's
protection."'

121. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831.
122. Id. at 831-32. The Court's focus was primarily on the need for a state to
have an enforcement mechanism to collect judgments rather than on incidental coststhat would fall upon an employee benefit plan as a result of garnishment proceedings. Id. at 834.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that the substantial administrative costs incurred by a plan when it acts as a garnishee fulfills the requisite connection between a state law and an ERISA plan to trigger preemption. Id. at
842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123. 490 U.S. 107 (1989).
124. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 148 (1987).
125. Morash, 490 U.S. at 109.
126. Id. at 115. See supra note 41 for the definition of an "employee welfare
benefit plan."
127. Morash, 490 U.S. at 115. The Court emphasized that ERISA does not
involve the regulation of employee wages. Id. The Court stated that the legislative
intent behind the enactment of ERISA was "to safeguard employees from the abuse
and mismanagement of funds that had been accumulated to finance various types of
employee benefits." Id. at 112.
128. Id. at 115-16.
129. Id. at 120.
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In FMC Corp. v. Holliday,3' the Court addressed the
question of whether ERISA preempted a Pennsylvania law that
precluded an ERISA plan from seeking reimbursement from a
participant for medical expenses when the participant recovered
the same expenses in a tort action.' 3' Relying on prior broad
interpretations of the preemption clause, the Court held that the
Pennsylvania law did "relate to" an employee benefit plan and
thus triggered preemption.'32 The Court established the
existence of the requisite relationship by noting that not only did
the Pennsylvania law specifically refer to ERISA plans,'33 but
it subjected them to regulations that varied from state to
state."u The Court was satisfied that preemption was essential
to preserving the uniformity of benefits law that ERISA was
enacted to maintain.'35
With the broad scope of ERISA's preemption clause holding
strong in the Rehnquist Court, the issue of preemption was
addressed again in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon.' The
Court considered whether ERISA preempted a Texas common
law claim that an Ingersoll-Rand employee was discharged
solely for the purpose of precluding the vesting of his
pension.3 7 Initially, the Court reiterated the broad reach of the
preemption clause that is evidenced by Congress' intent. and
by prior decisions. 1"' Two established limitations to the
130. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
131. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 54. The relevant section of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law provides that:
In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there
shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to workers' compensation benefits, benefits available under
section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating to availability of
benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) or benefits paid in
lieu thereof paid or payable under section 1719 (relating to coordination of
benefits).
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1720 (1987).
Section 1719 of the law states that "[any program, group contract or other
arrangement for payment of benefits . . . shall be construed to contain a provision
that all benefits provided therein shall be in excess of and not in duplication of any
valid and collectible first party benefits provided." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1719 (1987).
132. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58-59. The Court considered ERISA's savings
clause and deemer clause. Id. at 60-61.
133. Id. at 59. The Court referred to § 1719 of the Pennsylvania law that made
reference to "[any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of
benefits." Id. See supra note 131 for text of § 1719.
134. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60.
135. Id.
136. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
137. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 135.
138. Id. at 138. The Court noted that ERISA's preemption clause is so broad
that "our task of discerning congressional intent is considerably simplified." Id.
139. Id. at 138-39. See, e.g., FMC Corp.; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa-
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preemption clause were acknowledged by the Court. 4' First,
an indirect administrative burden placed on a benefit plan
pursuant to a state law does not necessarily trigger
preemption.1 ' Second, preemption applies only to state laws
that affect ongoing benefit plans.142 Because neither limitation
applied to the case at hand, and because the employee benefit
plan was fundamental to the employee's action against IngersollRand, the Court found that the requisite relationship existed for
preemption to apply." 3 The Court noted that this result is
consistent with the congressional intent behind ERISA
preemption, which is primarily to maintain national uniformity
in employee benefits law.'"
Perhaps the broadest interpretation of the phrase "relates to"
was set forth in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington
Board of Trade. " The issue in Greater Washington was
whether ERISA preempted a District of Columbia statute that
required employers to provide health care coverage to employees
receiving workers' compensation benefits.'
The Court
reiterated the broad reach of ERISA's preemption clause, noting
that preemption of a state law can apply even though the impact
on an ERISA plan is indirect and the state law parallels ERISA
directives.'4 7 The Court held that the District of Columbia
statute was preempted by ERISA.'" The primary basis for the
Court's conclusion was that existing benefit levels were used as
a benchmark to measure benefits due under the statute,' and
therefore, to the extent that the existing benefit levels were

chusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983);
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
140. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 139-40. Neither Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, nor Justice
Stevens joined in the portion of the opinion dealing with the scope of ERISA's pre-

emption clause. Id. at 135 n.*.
144. Id. at 142.
145. 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992).
146. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 582. The statute provided that "[any
employer who provides health insurance coverage for an employee shall provide
health insurance coverage equivalent to the existing health insurance coverage of the
employee while the employee receives or is eligible to receive workers' compensation
benefits under this chapter." D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (Supp. 1992).
147. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 583-84. The statute provides that "[tlhe provision of health insurance coverage shall not exceed 52 weeks and shall be at the same benefit level that
the employee had at the time the employee received or was eligible to receive
workers' compensation benefits." D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(3) (Supp. 1992).
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derived from an ERISA plan, the statute was preempted.'
Thus, the Court held it was primarily this reference by
implication to an ERISA plan that established the requisite
relationship for preemption. 1 '
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the
Court entered "uncharted territory" by finding preemption
primarily because the statute referred to an ERISA plan. 52
According to Justice Stevens, the statute neither affected plan
administration nor imposed any regulations upon the plan
itself."3 Justice Stevens suggested that the Court should have
looked at the case in light of the evils that ERISA was designed
to prevent."s
The history of ERISA's preemption clause is unique in that
the Court's interpretation of the clause has oscillated between a
very broad interpretation and a narrow interpretation.
Historically, the clause had been read very broadly.' Between
1987 and 1989, however, the Supreme Court set forth
limitations on the scope of the preemption clause. 5 ' For
example, a state law is not preempted by ERISA if the state law
"relates to" an employee benefit, but not to an employee benefit
plan. ' 7 Also, the fact that a state law places an indirect
burden on an ERISA plan does not necessarily command

150. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583-84.
151. Id. at 584. The Court noted that to the extent that the statute refers to
an ERISA plan, "any state law imposing requirements by reference to such covered
programs must yield to ERISA." Id.
152. Id. at 587-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 587.
154. Id. at 588. In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that "the Court should
pause to consider, first, the wisdom of the basic rule disfavoring federal pre-emption
of state laws, and second, the specific concerns identified in the legislative history as
the basis for federal pre-emption." Id. Justice Stevens believed that by undergoing
this type of analysis, the Court would not have found preemption. Id. Justice
Stevens commented: "Where that holding will ultimately lead, I do not venture to
predict." Id.
155. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). In
Shaw, the Court held that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
156. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139. The Court recognized that the
preemption clause is interpreted broadly; however, the Court reviewed prior cases
that placed limits on the phrase. Id.
157. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 8. The Court held that a state law mandating a
one-time severance payment to employees upon the closing of a plant did not constitute or relate to an employee benefit plan and thus was not preempted by ERISA.
Id. at 6.
In Morash, the Court held that a state law mandating the payment to employees of accrued vacation pay did not constitute or relate to an employee benefit
plan and thus was not preempted by ERISA. Morash, 490 U.S. at 114.
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preemption." 8 Demonstrating that the previous limitations
placed on the clause did not establish a jurisprudential trend
toward further restriction of the clause, the Court rendered one
of its broadest interpretations of preemption in 1992 in Greater
Washington. The mere reference to an ERISA plan in a state
law was the key factor that triggered preemption in Greater
Washington.'59 However, in its most recent look at ERISA's
preemption clause, the Court backed away from such a sweeping
interpretation and restricted its scope once again by allowing a
state law that placed an indirect, yet significant, burden on
ERISA plans to stand. A closer look at the Court's seemingly
inconsistent interpretation of the clause in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans may explain the
result.
While ideally the Court should strive to devise some
consistent, objective interpretation of the phrase "relates to" in
order to make application of ERISA more uniform, it cannot look
at the scope of the phrase in a vacuum.' Each case has the
potential to create far-reaching implications, and those
implications play a significant role in ERISA preemption
analysis.
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans there were three primary aspects of the Court's
decision.'6 1 First, the Court acknowledged that statutory
language alone did not provide a sufficient basis to render a
decision.'62 Second, the Court determined that preemption of
New York's surcharges was not necessitated by congressional
intent regarding ERISA legislation. Third, the Court was
deeply concerned with the far-reaching implications of the
decision if the New York surcharges were displaced."
One must ponder whether it was perhaps the far-reaching
158.
159.
160.

Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-32.
Greater Washington, 115 S. Ct. at 583.
Id. at 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens commented that the

Court should look beyond 'dictionary definitions of the word 'relate'" and consider
basic principles of federalism and congressional intent in ERISA preemption analysis.

Id.
161. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S.
Ct. at 1677.
162. Id. The Court referred to the language of ERISA as "unhelpful text." Id.
163. Id. at 1680. The Court believed that Congress was most concerned with
national uniformity in employee benefits law. Id. at 1677. The Court did not believe
that Congress envisioned federal preemption of 'general health care regulation." Id.
at 1680.
164. Id. at 1681. The Supreme Court stated that "any conclusion other than the
one we draw would bar any state regulation of hospital costs." Id. The Court referred to such an outcome as 'an unsettling result." Id.
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implications that an adverse decision would have had on the
petitioners that ultimately persuaded the Court. The Court faced
the consequences of squelching not only one state's efforts to set
hospital rates, but many such efforts by various states."
Justice Souter reviewed the multitude of state regulations that
were in effect when ERISA was enacted. 6 He recognized that
should a reading of the preemption clause be so broad as to
invalidate a large amount of existing state regulations, the
reading is most likely too broad and has surpassed the intended
scope of ERISA legislation.167
Even more significant was the possible effect of the decision,
not only on states' existing legislation, but on contemplated
health care reform initiatives.'68 Perhaps no preemption case
has posed the threat of such serious implications of a broad
interpretation of the clause as New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans because of the possible impact
on health care reform. 6 ' Until national health care reform
measures are passed by Congress, states must confront spiraling
health care costs and shortfalls in the funding of indigent care.
If New York's surcharges would have been preempted, hospitals
in New York would have lost a significant source of revenue that

165. Id. at 1683. In its final comments, the Court noted that Congress did not
intend to displace "myriad state laws" that would be scrutinized should preemption
prevail in the case at hand. Id.
166. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1681. See supra note 69.
167. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1679.
168. Brief for Petitioners, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans, at 4, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans,
115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (Nos. 93-1408, 93-1414, 93-1415). Petitioners contended that
the Second Circuit's decision "not only cripples New York State's efforts to grapple
with the cost and financing of hospital services and the availability of health insurance, but also guts other state legislative reform efforts in this arena.' Id.
169. In November 1993, The Health Security Act of 1993, the Clinton
Administration's plan for national health care reform, was introduced in Congress.
Dan M. Peterson and H. Jeffrey Brownawell, A Review of 'The Health Security Act
of 1993, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Jan., 1994, at 44. Mandates of the

Clinton Administration's plan (as proposed in a preliminary release of the plan in
Sept. 1993) included essentially universal health care coverage, a standard benefit
package, and various proposed methods to fund the system. Id. The "bottom line" of
the President's plan was to obtain universal health care coverage for all individuals
within 10 years. President's Bottom Line: Universal Coverage in 10 Years, INSIDE
HEALTH CARE REFORM, July 1, 1994. The plan was defeated in the 103d Congress;
however, the Clinton Administration still pursues reformation of the health care
system in the United States. Health Care Reform: Mitchell Abandons Health Care
Reform for This Year; Blames Republicans, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, September 28,
1994. After congressional defeat of his plan, President Clinton commented: "[T]his
journey is far, far from over." Id.
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is used to fund indigent care for its residents. 70 Thus, there is
a strong argument that it was ultimately the long-term
ramifications of this decision that guided the Court in its
decision.
It cannot be said with certainty to what extent this decision
effectively restricted the scope of the preemption clause for
subsequent cases. Should the Court be faced with a case today
that poses significantly less ramifications than those posed by
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans,
the Court may very well return to a broader definition of
preemption. However, to the extent a state law coincides with
health care reform objectives, this case may have started a trend
"'
toward allowing such a state law to stand.17
Janice M. Smith

170. Karen Pallarito, High Court Backs Some Patient Rate Surcharges-States
Allowed to Add Surcharges to Hospital Patient Rates Covered By Employee Care
Plans, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 1, 1995. "By rejecting the ERISA pre-emption
argument, the high court prevented hospitals from losing $200 million a year paid
by commercially insured patients." Id.
171. See Robert L. Roth, U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: Perhaps
Less than Meets the Eye, HEALTH LAW DIGEST, June 1995, at 7. "[T]he case law
relating to ERISA pre-emption of state health reform initiatives is still developing."
Id.

